In it, she revealed that the proportion of the U.S. intelligence budget spent on private contractors is 70 percent. By removing the scale from a table on intelligence expenditures but not the underlying figures, she also revealed that the amount the United States spends on such contractors is $42 billion, out of an implied total intelligence budget of $60 billion for the 2005 financial year. At its midpoint the presentation cheerily exhorted: 'We can't spy … if we can't buy!' Though it lags behind the privatization of military services, the privatization of intelligence has expanded dramatically with the growth in intelligence activities following the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States. 4 In a report published three days after those attacks, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence encouraged a 'symbiotic relationship between the Intelligence Community and the private sector'. 5 In addition to dollars spent -dominated by large items such as spy satellites -this has seen an important increase in the proportion of personnel working on contract. More than 70 percent of the Pentagon's Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) unit is staffed by contractors, known as 'green badgers', who also represent the majority of personnel in the DIA, the CIA's National Clandestine Service, and the National Counterterrorism Center. At the CIA's station in Islamabad contractors reportedly outnumber government employees three-to-one. 6 Controversy over government reliance on outsourcing in this area frequently coalesces around issues of cost (a contractor costs on average $250,000 per year, about double that of a government employee), 'brain-drain', and periodic allegations of selfdealing and other forms of corruption. More recently, however, the confirmation by the Director of the CIA that contractors have probably participated in waterboarding of detainees at CIA interrogation facilities has sparked a renewed debate over what activities it is appropriate to delegate to contractors, and what activities should remain 'inherently governmental'. 7 carried out in the first place -a topic that is not the focus of this paper. 8 )
Privatization of intelligence services raises many concerns familiar to the debates over private military and security companies (PMSCs). One of the key problems posed by PMSCs is their use of potentially lethal force in an environment where accountability may be legally uncertain and practically unlikely; in some circumstances, PMSCs may also affect the strategic balance of a conflict. 9 The engagement of private actors in the collection of intelligence exacerbates the first set of problems: it frequently encompasses a far wider range of conduct that would normally be unlawful, with express or implied immunity from legal process, in an environment designed to avoid scrutiny. Engagement of such actors in analysis raises the second set of issues: top-level analysis is precisely intended to shape strategic policy and the more such tasks are delegated to private actors the further they are removed from traditional accountability structures such as judicial and parliamentary oversight, and the more influence they may have on the executive. This paper will survey the manner in which U.S. intelligence functions have been outsourced in collection activities such as electronic surveillance, rendition, and interrogation, as well as the growing reliance on private actors for analysis. It will then turn to accountability issues raised by this new phenomenon, focusing on three areas: first, the necessary secrecy that limits oversight of intelligence and thus militates against further removal of such activities from democratic structures; secondly, the different incentives that exist for private rather than public employees; and finally the uncertainty as to what functions should be regarded as 'inherently governmental' and thus inappropriate for delegation to private actors.
Outsourcing Intelligence
The term 'intelligence' is often not well defined. At its most general, it is used synonymously with 'information' -reflecting the importance of publicly available ('open source') material in developing policy and suggesting an appropriate analogy See generally Chesterman and Lehnardt, supra note 7.
2008_06_04_Chesterman_Private_Intel_6_nf2_rev.doc (25-Sep-08) between much of intelligence and quality journalism. For present purposes, it will be used in two more narrow senses. The first denotes the collection of information that is not intended to be made public, sometimes referred to as 'secret intelligence'. This embraces two subcategories that have remained essentially unchanged since the Second World War: intelligence obtained wittingly or unwittingly from individuals, known as human intelligence (HUMINT), and communications intercepts and other 'signals' intelligence (SIGINT). 10 The second sense is a broader understanding of the term intelligence as the analytical product of intelligence agencies, best understood as a risk assessment intended to guide action. 11 Both areas have seen significant growth in the role of non-government employees.
A. Collection
Contracting out hard-and software requirements is probably the biggest single item of outsourcing but is not significantly different from other forms of government contracting. The reasons given for reliance on private contractors in the intelligence services are similar for those given by the military: the need for swift increases in skilled personnel that had been scaled back during the 1990s, and the flexibility of such increases being temporary rather than adding permanent government employees. 18 In addition, such hires have been used to avoid personnel ceilings imposed by Congress; it is also alleged that such outsourcing enables the intelligence agencies to avoid congressional and other oversight of specific activities. Some of these justifications have been accepted but oversight bodies have emphasized that 'in the long term' the intelligence community must reduce its dependence on contractors, if only for reasons of cost. The two major points of contention were the appropriate levels of oversight for such powers (the 2007 Act essentially substituted internal NSA processes for the requirement of FISA warrants) and, crucially, whether to grant immunity to telecommunications companies that had helped the government to conduct surveillance without warrants and thus potentially exposed themselves to civil liability. 28 President Bush authorized a fifteen day extension and urged Congress to grant 'liability protection' to those companies:
In order to be able to discover enemy --the enemy's plans, we need the cooperation of telecommunication companies. If these companies are subjected to lawsuits that could cost them billions of dollars, they won't participate; they won't help us; they won't help whatever one's view of warrantless surveillance and its legal basis, allowing litigation against cooperative telecommunications companies would be 'extraordinarily unfair'. As his byline noted, Ashcroft now heads a consulting firm with telecommunications companies as clients.
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The legislation ultimately lapsed. The following week, the Bush administration asserted that the government had 'lost intelligence information' because of the failure by Democrats in Congress to pass appropriate legislation, causing some telecommunications companies to refuse to cooperate. This was retracted hours later, apparently after the last holdout among the companies agreed to cooperate fully, even without new authorizing legislation. 31 Five months later, legislation was passed essentially granting the companies immunity as part of an overhaul of FISA.
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Examples of potential problems in outsourcing collection in this manner are not hard to find. As a result of an 'apparent miscommunication', an Internet provider complying with a warrant to forward emails from one account instead gave the FBI emails from every account on a small domain for which it served as host. Intelligence officials refer to this as 'overproduction', when third parties provide them with more information than actually required. 33 In the case of the NSA's program, the absence of the requirement for a warrant, the secrecy of the program (which was revealed only after the New York Times published a story it had withheld for more than a year 34 ), and the companies by the CIA is not unusual, though the reliance upon private companies for active support rather than cover is atypical. Officials who were involved in the practice suggested this was in order to protect government officials from involvement in a legally questionable process:
'Our policymakers would never confront the issue,' said Michael Scheuer, a former CIA counterterrorism officer who has been involved with renditions and supports the practice. 'We would say, "Where do you want us to take these people?" The mind-set of the bureaucracy was, "Let someone else do the dirty work." ' 38
The rendition programme became a scandal in Europe, with a report from the European Parliament leading to a resolution recommending, among other things, that 'all European countries that have not done so should initiate independent investigations into all stopovers made by civilian aircraft carried out by the CIA'. 
Interrogation
In February 2008 CIA Director Michael V. Hayden testified before the Senate and House, appearances most memorable for his confirmation that the United States had waterboarded at least three detainees. 40 He was also asked about the use of contractors.
Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee he confirmed that the CIA continued to use 'green badgers' at its secret detention facilities. 41 In testimony before the House two on both sides for Gore: Lloyd says this. Dick says that. Gore laughed and said, "That's a no-brainer. Of course it's a violation of international law, that's why it's a covert action. The guy is a terrorist. Go grab his ass."'). The involvement of private contractors in interrogation raises the most serious questions about accountability of persons outside the government structure wielding extraordinary authority and discretion in an environment clearly weighted against either investigation or prosecution. As in the case of private military contractors using potentially lethal force in a conflict zone, these concerns include the dubious prospects for after-the-fact accountability, but also standardization of levels of training and position within a defined command structure.
The justification for both sets of concerns were evident in the aftermath of revelations that prisoners had been abused at the U.S.-run Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Though investigations by the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command appear to have pre-dated public knowledge of the abuse in April 2004, 43 it was only after humiliating photographs of detainees were widely disseminated that serious action was taken. 44 Twelve uniformed personnel were convicted of various charges; most were given minor sentences but a handful of soldiers received multiple-year prison terms. 48 The case against Titan was dismissed as its linguists were found to have been 'fully integrated into the military units to which they were assigned and that they performed their duties under the direct command and exclusive operational control of military personnel.' 49 As CACI interrogators were subject to a 'dual chain of command', with significant independent authority retained by CACI supervisors, the case against it was allowed to continue.
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There appears to be only one case of a contractor being convicted of a crime in the United States connected with interrogations during the 'war on terror'. David A. Passaro was convicted of misdemeanour assault and felony assault with a dangerous weapon charges for his connection with the torture and beating to death of Abdul Wali in Afghanistan in June 2003. In February 2007 Passaro was sentenced to eight years and four months prison. His background is testimony to the danger of contracting out such interrogations: both his previous wives have alleged that he was abusive at home, and he had been fired from the police force after being arrested for beating a man in a parking lot brawl. 51 
B. Analysis
The involvement of contractors in analysis raises somewhat different questions from their involvement in collection of intelligence. A company's analytical work is less likely to be linked to abusive behaviour or the type of activities typically discussed in the context of PMSC accountability. And yet through its participation in and influencing of high-level decisions about national security, the consequences are troubling if they indicate a removal of such decisions from democratically accountable structures.
For the most part, the challenges that have been publicly identified tend to be at the level of personnel, notably the drain encouraged by significantly higher salaries in the private sector. A practice known as 'bidding back' sees officials leaving for industry and then being brought back in the capacity of consultant at a higher salary. Some estimate that as many as two-thirds of the Department of Homeland Security's senior personnel and experts have left for industry in recent years. 53 A 2006 report the Office of the Director of National Intelligence noted that the intelligence community increasingly finds itself in competition with its contractors:
Confronted by arbitrary staffing ceilings and uncertain funding, components are left with no choice but to use contractors for work that may be borderline 'inherently governmental' -only to find that to do that work, those same contractors recruit our own employees, already cleared and trained at government expense, and then 'lease' them back to us at considerably greater expense. for present purposes that even the perception of a conflict of interest should raise questions about the involvement of the corporate sector in the analytical functions of the intelligence services. It might be argued that this is little different from the influence of wealth on U.S. politics more generally, though as the next section argues the secrecy, incentive structures, and potentially abusive powers of the intelligence community warrant special care in regularizing the participation of private actors.
Accountability
As in the case of private military and security companies, obvious accountability issues arise when private actors wield potentially lethal force under the actual or apparent authority of the state but outside formal oversight structures. This section will not rehearse such arguments but will instead focus on three areas specific to the privatization of intelligence: secrecy, incentives, and the difficulty of defining what activities should be regarded as 'inherently governmental'.
A. Secrecy
Oversight of intelligence services is always difficult given the secrecy necessary for many of their activities to be carried out effectively. 61 In the case of privatization of these services within the U.S. intelligence community, however, secrecy appears to have compounded ignorance.
In Legislators subsequently called for the Department of Defense to compile a database of all intelligence-related contracts, 64 and for a Government Accountability Office investigation of contractors in Iraq. 65 Reports have been commissioned before. In fact, only one month before the House report a year-long examination of outsourcing by U.S. intelligence agencies was held up by the Director of National Intelligence, and then reclassified as a national secret. 66 The secrecy was justified on the basis that the United States does not reveal the cost and size of its intelligence operations, though recent disclosures on that topic by senior officials belie this explanation.
In December 2007, legislation approved by the House-Senate Conference on the Intelligence Authorization Act called on the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to produce a report by 31 March 2008 'describing the personal services activities performed by contractors across the intelligence community, the impact of such contractors on the intelligence community workforce, plans for conversion of contractor employment into government employment, and the accountability mechanisms that govern the performance of such contractors. ' 67 This waterboarding by the CIA. An effort to override the veto failed on 11 March 2008.
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Such information as does exist about the involvement of contractors often remains classified. Much is available to the contractors themselves, however, who are able to lobby members of Congress using that information. SAIC, for example, spent well over a million dollars in each of the past ten years on lobbying; in that period it was awarded between one and three billion dollars in government contracts annually. 69 Earmarks, in which members of congress add provisions to legislation directing funds to specific projects, have long been acknowledged in the intelligence sector but rarely made public. In some cases a list of the amounts of projects might be made available, but redacting the names of companies. 70 In November 2007 Congress broke with tradition by releasing information about $80 million worth of earmarks included in a defence appropriations bill.
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As is frequently the case, this new found transparency was driven in significant part by scandal. The previous year Randy 'Duke' Cunningham, a Republican Congressman from California, had been sentenced to eight years in prison for accepting $2 million in bribes from MZM, a defence contractor. Cunningham had used his position on the House appropriations and intelligence committees to win MZM tens of millions of dollars' worth of contracts with the CIA and the Pentagon's CIFA office. In a related case, Kyle 'Dusty' Foggo, a former executive director of the CIA (its third-ranking official), was indicted for conspiring with former MZM CEO Brent Wilkes (who inexplicably lacked a folksy nickname) to direct contracts to the company. 72 In addition to undermining effective oversight either by formal or informal means, 68 See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:h.r.02082. 69 such as media scrutiny, 73 access to secrets creates the possibility of abuse of those secrets. In 2006 the Boeing Corporation, a major defence contractor, agreed to a $565 million civil settlement arising from its use of sensitive bid information to win rocket launch contracts. The information had been provided by an engineer formerly employed by a competitor for the contracts who had moved to the Department of Defense.
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B. Incentives
The abuse of sensitive information is suggestive of the potential conflict of interests on the part of private actors engaged in intelligence activities. Discussions of this issue frequently paint a somewhat idealized picture of the patriotism and competence of fulltime government employees, but there are reasonable grounds to be wary of inserting a profit motive into intelligence activities. The former head of the CIA's clandestine service has been quoted as saying that 'There's a commercial side to it that I frankly don't like … I would much prefer to see staff case officers who are in the chain of command and making a day-in and day-out conscious decision as civil servants in the intelligence business.'
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It is also arguable that the freedom to outsource alters the incentives of the intelligence agencies themselves. John Gannon, a former CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence and now head of BAE Systems' Global Analysis Group, has noted that this freedom offers flexibility but also avoids the need to justify a fulltime employee and allocate responsibility, thereby breeding duplication and inhibiting collaboration. In the 1980s, 'what we discovered was that having smaller numbers forced collaboration, and collaboration was a good thing. As you soon as you start throwing money at the intelligence community, not only does it lead to more contractors, it also leads to 73 See, e.g., Caparini, 'Controlling and Overseeing Intelligence Services in Democratic States', in Born and Caparini, supra note 61, at 3; Chesterman, supra note 8. It is possible, of course, that a profit motive may encourage better behaviour through the operation of a kind of market. There is evidence that this may be happening gradually in the context of PMSCs, particularly through professionalization of the industry and the creation of industry associations such as the British Association of Private Security Companies (BAPSC) and the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA). This is largely being driven by self-interest as some actors seek to establish themselves as 'legitimate' and thereby raise the costs of entry for competitors while enabling the charging of higher fees for similar services. Management. 81 The 'market' thus tends to be dominated by former military and civilian officials who already have such clearances, exacerbating the 'brain drain' problems cited earlier 82 and creating predictable monopoly-type problems.
Though this has led to established relationships with a select group of firms, in respect of individuals being retained to collect human intelligence -particularly interrogators and interpreters connected to the 'Global War on Terror' -the need to get personnel on the ground and results back home has negated considerations of repeat encounters. As in the case of PMSCs, the assumption that such activities are atypical reduces the incentive to use any leverage that does exist to require adequate training or oversight. 83 Finally, and most obviously, the secrecy necessary for certain intelligence operations undermines the possibility of information flowing freely. In some circumstances there may be collusion in avoiding oversight, as when activities -such as rendition -are outsourced precisely for this reason. More generally, the movement of a limited number of individuals between the government and private intelligence worlds may encourage a form of regulatory capture when government employees are nominally tasked with overseeing former colleagues and future employers.
C. 'Inherently Governmental' Functions
The simplest way of containing some of the problems outlined in this paper would be to forbid certain activities from being delegated or outsourced to private actors at all. Intelligence services have a chequered history of abuse, but their legitimate activities tend to be justified in established democracies by reference to their grounding in the rule of law -a relatively recent requirement in some countries 84 85 In the United States, this question is framed in the language of 'inherently governmental' functions, which are presumed to be carried out by government employees only. 86 Debates concerning public functions in the United States frequently emphasize not the need to maintain certain functions in public hands but rather to justify passing them to the government in the first place; 87 the definition of 'inherently governmental' has thus emerged not as a sphere to be protected but rather as an exception to the more general push to privatization. Legislation adopted by Congress in 1998 as part of a larger privatization effort required government agencies to identify inherently governmental functions in order to enable cost comparisons between private bids and public budgets for everything else. 88 An inherently governmental function was defined as a 'function that is so intimately related to the public interest as to require performance by Federal Government employees.' 89 The Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted in a 2002 report that there had been some uncertainty about how to apply this broad definition, but argued that it was clear that government workers need to perform certain warfighting, judicial, enforcement, regulatory, and policy-making functions … Certain other capabilities, … such as those directly linked to national security, also must be retained in-house to help ensure effective mission execution. 90 Uncertainties about the limits continue, however, and the Department of Defense in particular has failed to adopt or apply consistently a clear interpretation. 91 The executive has adopted various guidelines seeking to elaborate a definition. The 1983 version of an Office of Management and Budget (OMB) circular on this topic stated that 'Certain functions are inherently Governmental in nature, being so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance only by Federal employees.' 92 The definition was elaborated as including 'those activities which require either the exercise of discretion in applying Government authority or the use of value judgment in making decisions for the Government' and were said normally to fall into two categories: Ibid., Attachment A: Inventory Process, para. B(1)(a) ('An inherently governmental activity is an activity that is so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance by government personnel. These activities require the exercise of substantial discretion in applying government authority and/or in making decisions for the government. Inherently governmental activities normally fall into two categories: the exercise of sovereign government authority or the establishment of procedures and processes related to the oversight of monetary transactions or entitlements.'). 99 Ibid., Attachment A: Inventory Process, para. B(1)(c).
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The ODNI in its 2006 'Five Year Strategic Human Capital Plan' noted that OMB had requested it to conduct a study to determine if contractors were engaged in intelligence community work that is '"inherently governmental" and hence improper'. 101 The study was said to be underway as an effort to determine the optimum mix of civilian, military, and contractor personnel', but was ultimately classified secret and, apparently, buried. 102 In June 2007 the CIA announced its own plans to review the use of contractors, including the identification of jobs that should be performed only by government personnel. 103 In the absence of strong political direction, there is little prospect of intelligence agencies adopting a robust definition of 'inherently governmental' functions. In any case, the significance of this limitation is diminished by the ability to outsource even inherently governmental functions in so far as they may be construed merely as implementing policy with some form of oversight. 104 With respect to the activities considered in section I of this paper, electronic surveillance by telecommunications companies may be an acceptable or necessary delegation of the implementation of government policy, though in some circumstances it might have fallen foul of the broader 'control' of intelligence operations test included in the 1992 Policy Letter. 105 Rendition might also be construed as mere implementation of government policy, though it may violate other laws -notably including those of the territories through which CIA transport planes have passed. 106 There would, however, contractors are essential to the intelligence community's work -is at least partly accurate. Procuring hardware and software from the private sector, and engaging in electronic surveillance through the cooperation of telecommunications companies may be the only way to carry out such functions effectively. More troubling are those circumstances in which outsourcing has been undertaken to avoid oversight, as in the case of rendition, where it places the life or liberty of persons in the hands of private actors, as in the case of interrogation, or where it renders the formulation of national security policy susceptible to actual or apparent influence.
Consideration of these issues has tended to focus on overblown costs, drains on government personnel, and episodic outrage at scandals in the form of corruption or, more recently, abuse. This paper has argued that addressing the problems raised by privatization of intelligence services requires engagement with the structural bars to accountability considered in section II. Accepting the necessary secrecy of much -but not all -of these activities requires a corresponding limitation on their further removal from public scrutiny. Understanding the incentives also suggests the need for wariness in embracing a market regulatory approach to the problem. Clarity could most effectively be achieved by a transparent definition of what functions should be 'inherently governmental', though this requires political capital that is unlikely to be spent in the absence of scandal. 
